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IS THE DOUBLE TAXATION OF SAVINGS UNFAIR?
GREGORY ARNOLD*
The fairness of the double taxation of savings is an old issue in tax
policy. The issue was first raised over a century ago by John Stuart
Mill, who pointed out that an income tax affects savers in two different
ways.' First, it reduces the amount of income they are able to save and
thus indirectly reduces the interest they receive on their savings. Second,
it directly taxes the interest they do receive. Mill felt that this "twice
taxation" of interest was unfair to savers. In the first half of this century,
Irving Fisher reached the same conclusion.2 Other tax theorists have
disagreed with Mill and Fisher and argued that double taxation is fair
rather than unfair.3 The most interesting of these arguments have been
presented in recent years by Alvin Warren4 and Mark Kelman. 1 Although
Fisher's theory is more complex than Mill's, and Warren's and Kelman's
are more
complex than Fisher's, the double taxation issue still is unre6
solved.
This article makes another attempt to resolve the double taxation issue.
In the process, it injects still more complexity into the debate. This
complexity is unavoidable if the issue is to be resolved in a satisfactory
manner. The article is divided into five parts. Part I explains why the
double taxation of savings occurs and why it can be thought to be unfair.
Part II considers the validity of three theories of the fairness of the
double taxation of savings, including two that are similar to those proposed
by Warren and Kelman. All three theories are based upon the assumption
that the utility (psychic income) of a taxpayer is relevant to the fairness
issue. The implications of this assumption are further considered in Part
III, which shows that the fairness of double taxation may depend upon
whether utility is received solely from income or also from wealth, and
upon whether or not the disutility received from work is thought to be

* Member of California Bar; B.A. 1976, University of Washington; M.A. (economics) 1978,
University of Chicago; J.D. 1984, University of Oregon; LL.M. (taxation) 1985, New York University.
1. J.S. MI.L, PINCIPLEr.s OF Po.TncA. ECONOMY, bk. V, ch. I, § 4, 545-46 (Laughlin ed. 1887)
(1st ed. 1848).
2. Fisher, Double Taxation of Savings, 29 AM. EcoN. Ray. 16 (1939); 1. FISHER, THE NATURE
OF CAMrTAL AND INCoME 249-53 (1906).
3. Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 370, 374-78 (1979); Guillebaud,
Income Tax and the "Double Taxation" of Savings, 45 EcON. J. 484 (1935).
4. Warren. Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081,
1097-1101 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Warren, Fairness).
5. Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. Rav. 649 (1983) (hereinafter cited
as Kelman, Fairness).
6. Neither Warren nor Kelman claims to have resolved the double taxation issue. Although
Warren prefers the income tax to the consumption tax, he merely concludes that the argument that
double taxation is unfair is "not convincing." Warren, Fairness, supra note 4, at 1101. Kelman
argues that double taxation will be fair under certain assumptions and unfair under others. Kelman,
Fairness, supra note 5, at 657-58, 679-80.
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relevant to fairness. Part IV questions the assumption that utility is
important. Part V shows why double taxation could be unfair to borrowers
as well as to savers.
I.

THE DOUBLE TAXATION ISSUE
This part of the article describes the basic concepts underlying the
double taxation issue. First, it explains the meaning of the phrase "double

taxation of savings" and demonstrates that double taxation occurs under
an income tax, but not under either a consumption tax or a wage tax.
Second, it discusses the concept of fairness and shows why double taxation

may be unfair.
Double Taxation
As John Stuart Mill pointed out,7 an income tax causes two separate
reductions in the interest income of savers." First, it reduces the amount
of income they are able to save and thus indirectly reduces their interest
income. 9 Second, it directly taxes the interest income they do receive.
These two separate reductions in the aftertax interest income of savers
are commonly referred to as the "double taxation of savings."' 0

A.

7. See supra note I and accompanying text.
8. This will be true of a comprehensive income tax which taxes all income regardless of its
source or use. It will be less true of a loophole-ridden income tax, which may be closer to a wage
or consumption tax than to an income tax. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 H~A.v. L. REV. 1113, 1117-18 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Andrews, Consumption
Tax). In recent years there has been a lively debate about the desirability of a comprehensive tax
base. A sampling of the literature is B. BrTTKER, C. GALVIN, R. MusorRvE & J. PEcHMAN, A
COMPREHENSWE INcomE TAX BASE? A DEBATE (1968); Aaron, What Is a Comprehensive Tax Base
Anyway?, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 543 (1969); Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income
Tax Reform, 80 HA~v. L. REv. 925 (1967); Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment,
81 HA Xv. L. REV. 63 (1967); Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, NAT'L TAX J. I
(1957).
9. This assumes that an income tax will cause savers to reduce their savings as well as their
consumption. It is possible, of course, that savers would instead keep their savings at the same
level as in a taxfree world, and they would reduce their consumption by the full amount of the
income tax. This is implausible, however. People save more as their incomes increase and less as
their incomes decrease. Since an income tax reduces after tax incomes, it should reduce savings.
In fact, since the percentage as well as the amount of income saved increases with income, an
income tax should reduce savings by proportionately more than the tax rate. For example, an
increase in income from $80 to $100 might cause savings to increase from $10 to $15. If so, a
20% income tax would reduce income from $100 to $80 and savings from $15 to $10. Thus, savings
would fall by 33%, proportionately more than the 20076 tax rate.
10. The phrase "double taxation of savings" is semantically imprecise for two reasons. First,
only interest income is reached by the direct tax on interest, so only it is reduced twice by the
income tax. Thus, the double taxation of savings really is the "double taxation of interest." Second,
double taxation is not limited to the interest received from savings but extends to the capital gains
and dividends received from investments. An income tax reduces the amount that investors are able
to invest, thereby indirectly reducing the return that they receive on their investments. It then
imposes a direct tax on their capital gains or dividends. Thus, there is "double taxation" of
investments as well as of savings. In order to keep the terminology in this article from becoming
unwieldy, "savers" will be used as a shorthand for "savers and investors," "savings" will be used
as shorthand for "savings and investments," and "interest" will be used as a shorthand for "interest,
dividends, and capital gains."
Double taxation will be less pronounced in the case of capital gains than in the case of interest
or dividends. A capital gain is never realized until disposition of the property, I.R.C. § 61(a)(3),
sometimes is not realized even then, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031, or if realized may not be recognized,
see, e.g., I.R.C. § 351.

Summer 19901

DOUBLE TAXATION OF SAVINGS

The double taxation of savings can be illustrated by an example. Imagine

a saver who lives in a taxfree world with a 10°76 interest rate. He receives
$1,000 of income at the end of the first year and saves it all. At the
100o interest rate, he will receive $100 of interest income by the end of
the second year, leaving him with total funds of $1,100. Now imagine
that a flatrate 2007o income tax is imposed in this world." The saver
pays a $200 tax on his $1,000 of income received at the end of the first

year, reducing the amount he can save from $1,000 to $800.12 The interest
rate is unchanged at 10076, so his $800 of savings give him interest income

of $80. Thus, his interest income is reduced by $20 even before a tax
is imposed on interest. When the 207o tax is imposed on his interest

income, his interest income falls by another $16 (2007o of $80) to $64.
The income tax has imposed a double "tax" on the saver. The first

"tax" is the $20 reduction in the saver's interest income that results
from the tax-induced reduction in his savings from $1,000 to $800. The
second tax is the direct $16 tax on his interest income.' 3 The two "taxes"
combined impose a $36, or 36076, 4 tax on the interest income the saver
would receive in a taxfree world.'
The definition of "taxation" that is implicit in the concept of double
taxation requires a brief discussion. Taxation is commonly thought to
occur when the government collects money from taxpayers. It is clear
that the second component of the double tax-the direct $16 tax on
interest income-is a tax in this sense. It is just as clear, however, that
the first component-the $20 reduction in interest income caused by the
$200 reduction in savings-is not. Since there is no tax collection that
corresponds to this first component, it might be argued that the first
component of the double tax is not a "tax" at all and should be ignored.' 5
Such an argument has two flaws.

11. The analysis in the text will assume that tax rates are flat rather than progressive. This
assumption has no implications for fairness except in the case of a wage tax. See infra text
accompanying notes 120-21 for an analysis of the fairness of a wage tax under progressive rates.
12. In the example all income is saved, so savings necessarily fall by the tax rate. When taxpayers
save only a portion of their incomes, an income tax is likely to cause them to reduce their savings
by proportionately more than the tax rate. See supra note 9.
13. If double taxation were eliminated, the second component would be $20 rather than $16.
Thus, the first component might be viewed as $16 rather than $20.
14. When taxpayers save only a portion of their incomes, the income tax probably will cause
them to reduce their savings by proportionately more than the tax rate. See supra note 9. Thus,
the two taxes combined would impose a tax on interest that exceeds 3607o. However, since savings
are reduced by proportionately more than the tax rate, consumption will be reduced by proportionately
less than the tax rate. The proportionately smaller reduction in consumption would offset the
proportionately greater reduction in savings. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that an
income tax always causes the same proportionate reduction in savings as in income.
15. It appears that no one has argued in writing that the first component of the double tax is
not really a tax. Instead, writers on the subject often just assume that the first "tax" is not really
a tax. See, e.g., Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,
88 HAv. L. REv. 931, 940 (1975) (a wage tax "effectively exempts all property income from
taxation while including all income from personal services")); Klein, Timing in Personal Taxation,
6 J. LEo.A StuD. 461 (1977) (a wage tax imposes a "zero tax rate on income from invested
savings"). Warren and Klein are correct in one sense, because a wage tax (the first component of
the income tax) imposes no tax on the income that is actually received from property or savings.
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First, if the first component of the double tax is ignored, the tax rate
on interest will be calculated by reference to a world in which the saver
receives only $80 of interest. Such a world is one in which the income
tax already has been imposed on the income received at the end of the
first year. Thus, the tax rate on interest would be calculated by reference
to a world that already contains the tax under consideration. This simply
is not a valid way to calculate tax rates. If tax rates are to have any
meaning, they must be calculated by reference to a world that is unaffected
6
by the tax under consideration.'
Second, the first component of the double tax is a tax in all respects
except for its form. It affects the saver like a direct tax on interest,
because it causes him to forego $20 of interest he otherwise would have
received. The saver does not care that the $20 is extracted indirectly
rather than directly. It also affects the government like a direct tax on
interest. When the government collects the $200 tax on the saver's first
year income, it has $200 it could save. If it did, it would receive the
$20 of interest income that the saver would have received in a taxfree
world.17 Viewed in another way, at the end of the second year the saver
and the government are both in the same position as if the government
had allowed the saver to keep the $200 but had taken the entire $20 of
interest the saver received on that $200. It must be concluded that the
government has indeed collected the $20 first component as well as the
$16 second component of the double tax.
The importance that is attached here to the indirect component of the
double tax is similar to the importance that tax theorists attach to the
indirect effects of other taxes. For example, the corporate income tax
is directly collected from corporations, but this does not mean that tax
theorists necessarily consider it to be a tax on either corporations or
their shareholders. Rather, they consider it to be a tax on customers to
the extent that it causes corporations to charge higher prices and a tax

However, a wage tax reduces the amount of income that can be invested in property or saved,
and thus it effectively imposes a tax on the income that would be received from property or savings
in a taxfree world. When Warren and Klein consider only the property income that is actually
received, they calculate the wage tax's effective tax on property income by reference to a world in
which the wage tax already has been imposed.
16. One perhaps could argue that a taxfree world is not the appropriate standard by which to
judge the fairness of a tax system. See infra note 81. It may be assumed, however, that the fairness
of a tax system should never be judged by reference to a world in which a component of the tax
under consideration had already been imposed.
A possible reason that tax theorists forget about the first component of the double tax is that
the first and second components are imposed at different times. The first component is imposed
at the time that income is saved, while the second component is imposed at the time that interest
is received. Tax theorists who are focusing on one time period may forget about taxes imposed in
other time periods.
17. This assumes that the government would face the same interest rate as the saver. Such an
assumption probably is realistic. The government could save money by putting it in a bank account
or in investments, but as long as it runs a deficit it probably would "save" money by reducing
its borrowing. A reduction in borrowing would not directly give the government any interest income,
but it would give the government the equivalent, a reduction in the interest it must pay on its
debts. The interest saved would equal the interest rate paid on government securities. Taxpayers
can save at that interest rate by putting their money in certain mutual funds.
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on employees to the extent that it causes corporations to pay lower
wages.' 8 Since tax theorists attach importance to the indirect effects of
the corporate tax, they hardly can ignore the indirect effects of the double
taxation of interest.

In order to avoid semantic confusion, this article will use "effective
tax rate" to refer to the tax rate represented by the sum of the two
components of the double tax. "Nominal tax rate" or "tax rate" will
be used to refer to the usual concept of tax rate. Applying this terminology
to the above example, the saver's interest income is taxed at a 20070
nominal tax rate and at a 3601o effective tax rate.

Because double taxation causes the effective tax rate on interest income
to exceed the nominal tax rate, the income tax falls relatively more heavily

on savers than on nonsavers. This phenomenon can be illustrated by
returning to the example of the taxfree world. Consider a nonsaver who,

like the saver we have been considering, has a first year income of $1,000
and a second year income of $100. Like the saver, his first year income
will be taxed at a 2007o nominal (and effective) tax rate, leaving him

with an aftertax income of $800. Unlike the saver, however, his $100
of second year income will be unaffected by the tax on his first year
income, because his second year income consists of wage income rather
than interest income. Consequently, he faces only a 2007o effective tax
rate on his second year income, leaving him with a second year aftertax
income of $80. This contrasts with the saver's second year aftertax income
of $64. It may be concluded that the income tax imposes equal taxes
on the saver and the nonsaver in the first year but imposes a greater
tax on the saver in the second year.
Double taxation does not exist under either a wage tax or a consumption
tax. 19 A wage tax is essentially just an income tax that does not tax

18. Economists have yet to decide upon the incidence of the corporate income tax, but they
generally feel that shareholders bear at least a portion of its burden. Perhaps the most influential
study of its incidence is Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL.
EcoN. 215 (1962). Harberger concluded that the corporate tax is borne by shareholders, rather than
consumers or workers. The unresolved state of this field is suggested by a study in the following
year which found that shareholders bear none of the burden of the corporate tax, at least not in
the short-run. M. KRzYZANtAK AND R. MUSGAV.E, TiEs SvrnG OF Tm CORPORATION INCOME TAX
(1963). The Krzyzaniak-Musgrave study has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Cragg, Harberger, and
Mieszkowski, Empirical Evidence on the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 75 1. POL.
ECON. 811 (1967); R. GOODE, RATES OF RETURN, INcomE SHARES, AND CORPORATE TAX INCIDENCE,
Errcrs OF CORPORATION INcosi TAX (M. Krzyzaniak ed. 1966). For an analysis of various studies
regarding corporate tax incidence, see B. SANI AND T. MATHEW, TiE Sm'FING AND INCIDENCE
OF Tm CoRPoiTxIoN INcosE TAX (1976).
19. For discussion of wage and consumption taxes, see Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note
8; Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, supra note .15;
Andrews, Fairness and the Choice Between a Consumption-Type and an Accretion-Type Personal
Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARv. L. REv. 947 (1975); Warren, Fairness, supra
note 4; U.S. DEP'T OF Tim TREASUtY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 21-52, 113-44 (1977)
(hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS); Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARv.
L. REv. 1575 (1979); Strnad, Taxation of Income from Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37 STAN.
L. REv. 1023 (1985); Kaplow & Warren, An Income Tax by Any Other Name-A Reply to Professor
Strnad, 38 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1986); Strnad, The Bankruptcy of Conventional Tax Timing Wisdom
is Deeper than Semantics: A Rejoinder to Professors Kaplow and Warren, 39 STAN. L. REV. 389
(1987).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 20

interest income. 20 With interest income removed from the tax base, the
only remaining income is wage (labor) income and windfall income such
as prizes.2

Because windfall income is a relatively unimportant source

of 'income, a wage tax essentially is just a tax on wages (hence its name).
If a wage tax were imposed in our taxfree world, the saver's $1,000 of
first year wage income 22 would be taxed at 200, leaving him with $800
of savings. That $800 will give him $80 of interest at the 1007o interest
rate. Since interest is not taxed by the wage tax, the saver will end up
with $800 of savings and $80 of interest. Since both his first year and
his second year income is 20%70 below what he would receive in a taxfree
world, he faces an effective tax rate of 2007o on all of his income. The
double tax on interest has been eliminated. The elimination of the double
tax does not affect the nonsaver, who still has an aftertax income of
$800 in the first year and $80 in the second year.23 Accordingly, the
saver and the nonsaver now have identical aftertax incomes.
Double taxation could also be eliminated by a consumption tax. The
consumption tax that will be considered here is the cash-flow consumption
tax.2 4 Such a tax is like the present income tax, except taxpayers would
be allowed a deduction for the net increase in their savings and investments
during the year. 2 This exclusion of savings and investments from tax
eliminates the double taxation of savings, as can be seen by the example
of the saver and nonsaver. The consumption tax will impose no tax on
the saver's $1,000 of first year income, because such a tax does not tax
saved income. By the end of the second year the saver will have received
a full $100 of interest on his $1,000 of savings. If at that time he
consumes his $1,100 of savings and interest, he will face a 20% tax.26
That tax will equal $220, leaving him with $880 of aftertax income.
His effective tax rate is 2007o, because his interest income has been taxed
only once, at the time of consumption. The double tax has been eliminated.
The saver, like the nonsaver, pays total taxes of $220 and has an aftertax

20. As explained in supra note 10, "interest" is defined to include all income from savings and
investments.
21. The present tax law does not include gifts and bequests in the definition of income. See

1.R.C. § 102. If a wage tax were to use the same definition of income, gifts and bequests would
escape tax.
22. In order to keep the analysis from getting too complicated, it will be assumed that the
saver's first year income is composed entirely of wage income. If a portion were composed of
interest income, the effect of double taxation upon first year as well as upon second year income
would have to be considered.
23. Since the nonsaver's income is comprised entirely of wage income, he is affected in the
same way by the wage tax as by the income tax. Thus, he has the same aftertax income under
the wage tax as under the income tax.
24. For discussion of the cash-flow consumption tax, see the sources in supra note 19.
25. Taxpayers would have to pay tax on any net decrease in savings and investments during
the year.
26. The wage and consumption taxes both impose a $220 tax burden on the saver. However,
while $200 of the wage tax's burden is imposed in the first year and $20 in the second year, the
consumption tax's entire $220 burden is delayed until the second year. Thus, the present value of
the $220 tax burden is less under the consumption tax than under the wage tax. For the significance
of this, see infra note lS.
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income of $880.27 Thus, a consumption tax imposes the same tax burden
upon savers as upon nonsavers.2
B.

Fairness
"Fairness" in the context of the double taxation of savings refers to
horizontal equity. 29 Horizontal equity occurs when equal taxes are imposed
upon equally situated taxpayers. The concept of horizontal equity is easier
to state than to apply, because it can be interpreted in several different
ways.
First, there is the question of the meaning of "equal taxes." As
explained above, the double taxation of savings occurs because taxes have
an indirect as well as a direct component. If both of those components
are viewed as taxes, the phrase "equal taxes" in the definition of horizontal equity should refer to equal tax burdens, or the sum of the
indirect as well as the direct component of taxes. Thus, horizontal equity
would occur when equal tax burdens are imposed upon equally situated
taxpayers. However, as will be seen below, not all theories of the fairness
of double taxation follow this view of the meaning of horizontal equity.3 0
Such theories are flawed, as will be pointed out in section D of Part
II of the article.
Second, there is the problem of the meaning of "equally situated
taxpayers." Equally situated taxpayers can be viewed either as those with
equal utilities ("psychic incomes"), or as those with equal monetary
incomes. The fairness of double taxation may vary depending on which
of these views is followed. Parts II and III of the article will consider
fairness under the first view. Part IV will present the argument that
fairness is more appropriately determined under the second view.
It must be kept in mind that the fairness of double taxation is justone of many factors that bears on the relative attractiveness of the
income, wage, and consumption taxes." Other relevant factors are vertical
equity, the adequacy of tax revenues in the absence of double taxation,
the effect of double taxation upon economic efficiency, and the transitional
problems involved in the shift to a new tax system. This article addresses
none of those other factors and thus will be unable to draw any conclusions
about the overall attractiveness of the income, wage, and consumption
taxes.

27. Since the nonsaver consumes all of his income, he is affected in the same way by the
consumption tax as by the income tax. Under either he will have a 20%0 tax on his first year
income of S1,000, and a 20%7o
tax on his second year income of S100, leaving him with a total
aftertax income of S880.
28. In one sense the consumption tax taxes the saver more lightly than the nonsaver. All of
the saver's taxes are postponed until the second year. while much of the nonsaver's taxes are paid
in the first year. See supra note 26 and infra note 115.
29. For a discussion of horizontal equity, see Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy,
17 STAN. L. REv. 567, 579-80 (1965).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 37, 46, 66 and 67.
31. For a general discussion of the factors to be considered when choosing between various tax
systems, see Sneed, supra note 29.
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II. THREE THEORIES THAT COMPARE UTILITIES
Horizontal equity occurs when equal taxes are imposed upon equally
situated taxpayers. As noted above, equally situated taxpayers can be
either those with equal monetary incomes or those with equal utilities.
This part of the article will assume that horizontal equity occurs when
equal taxes are imposed upon taxpayers with equal utilities.
"Utility" will be used as shorthand for the subjective well-being,
satisfaction, or psychic income that a taxpayer receives from holding or
spending monetary income or its substitutes (such as fringe benefits).
Utility will not include the well-being, satisfaction, or psychic income
that is received from sources, such as friendships, that are unrelated to
monetary income or its substitutes." There are several reasons for ignoring
the satisfaction or psychic income received from sources other than
monetary income. One is that such psychic income is impossible to
measure. Another is that psychic income received from nonmonetary
sources tends to flow from the personal aspects of our lives, and it
probably should be beyond the reach of the government and its tax
system. Still another is that psychic income received from sources other
than monetary income is likely to vary randomly rather than systematically
among taxpayers, and so it is unlikely to be related to monetary income.
Thus, a tax system which imposes taxes upon monetary income could
not reach such utility.
All three of the theories presented in this part of the article attempt
to resolve the double taxation issue by comparing the utilities of savers
and nonsavers. First, the "present value theory" claims that the present
value of a person's utility will be no greater if he saves his income than
if he consumes it, and thus that it is unfair to tax a saver more heavily
than a nonsaver. Second, the "additional utility theory" is based on the
idea that the utilities of savers must exceed those of nonsavers, because
savers receive utility from interest income. A variation of this theory
proposed by Mark Kelman also is considered. 3 If either this theory or
Kelman's variant of it is correct, -the double taxation of savings is fair.
Third, the "expectation theory" claims that the present value theory
erroneously focuses on the expected, rather than on the actual, utilities
of savers and nonsavers. If the focus were on actual utilities, the double
taxation of savings34 would be fair. This theory is similar to one proposed
by Alvin Warren.
We will see that none of these theories adequately resolves the fairness
issue. It should be noted that each of these three theories is based upon
the implicit assumption that the utilities of savers and nonsavers are
relevant to the fairness issue. The soundness of that assumption will be
considered in Part IV of the article.
32. Psychic income from sources other than monetary income typically is ignored by tax theorists.
See Warren, Fairness, supra note 4, at 1107; Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 667-69.
33. Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 670-79.
34. Warren, Fairness, supra note 4, at 1097-1101.
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The Present Value Theory
The "present value theory"" states that the present value of a person's
consumption expenditures measures the utility that he receives from those
consumption expenditures. Let us use the example of a saver and a
nonsaver, each of whom in a taxfree world has $1,000 of first year wage
income that can be either consumed or saved. Neither has any second
year wage income. However, at the 1007o interest rate the saver has $100
of second year interest income. The nonsaver consumes his $1,000 of
wage income at the end of the first year. The present value at the time
of consumption of that $1,000 of immediate consumption is $1,000. By
contrast, the saver saves his entire $1,000, and at a 1007o interest rate
receives $100 of interest during the second year. He then consumes his
$1,100 of interest and principal. If his $1,100 of second year consumption
is discounted back to the end of the first year at the 10070 interest rate,
his consumption has a present value of $1,000.36 Thus, the consumption
expenditures of both the saver and the nonsaver have a present value
(discounted to the first year) of $1,000. If the present value theory is
correct in its assumption that the present value of consumption measures
the utility received from consumption, it must be the case that the saver
and the nonsaver have equal utilities. A wage tax is therefore a fair tax,
since it will impose equal taxes on equally situated taxpayers by imposing
equal taxes on first year income. An income tax is not a fair tax, because
it imposes an additional tax on the saver (the tax on interest) even though
his utility is no greater than that of the nonsaver.
Before we investigate the soundness of the present value theory, we
should note that it ignores the indirect tax on the saver's interest income
when determining the taxes imposed on the saver. The only taxes on the
saver that it considers are the tax on wage income in the first year and
the direct tax on interest income in the second year. Consequently, it
fails to use the most direct method of "proving" that the double taxation
of savings is unfair. That method is to note that the wage tax will
indirectly reduce the saver's second year income by reducing the amount
that he can save. Thus, a wage tax is fair because it will tax the saver
upon any utility that he may receive from his interest income. An income
A.

35. Apparently no author has asserted that the present value theory demonstrates the unfairness
of double taxation. However, the present value theory is mentioned in the literature. See Warren,
Fairness, supra note 4, at 1097-1101; Klein, supra note 15, at 469-70; Gunn, supra note 3, at 37577. Gunn, in fact, says that "[r]eduction to present value is essential to the argument that the
income tax involves 'double taxation of savings' and is therefore unfair to savers." Id. at 377.
36. The present value of any future expenditure is the amount of money that would have to
be presently saved to make that expenditure in the future. For example, in order to make an
expenditure of S121 in two years, $100 would have to be saved now at a 10% interest rate. After
one year, the $100 of savings would have grown to S110, and after two years it would have grown
to S121. If the interest rate were greater than 10%, less would have to be saved, and thus the
present value of $121 would be less than $100. The present value of any expenditure can be viewed
as the present cost of that expenditure. In the example, the present cost of the $121 expenditure
is $100. See generally J.HntsHL.En'a, PRICE THEORY AND APPUCATIONS 487-501 (2d ed. 1980).
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tax is unfair because it will reduce the saver's interest income by more
than the tax rate (in comparison to a taxfree world). Since the present
value theory ignores the indirect component of the tax on interest, it is
one of those theories which, as noted above,3 7 is based upon the wrong
notion of horizontal equity.
Even if the notion of horizontal equity underlying the present value
theory were correct, the theory still would be wrong. This can be seen
by considering the example of the saver and nonsaver who, as the present
value theory would have us believe, have equal utilities at a 10% interest
rate in a taxfree world. Imagine that the interest rate in that taxfree
world were to increase to 1507o. The nonsaver would gain no utility from
that higher interest rate, because changes in the interest rate cannot have
any effect on the utility of someone who does not save. However, the
saver would gain utility from the higher interest rate, because now he
would receive $150 rather than $100 of interest on his $1,000 of savings.
If the saver and the nonsaver had equal utilities when the saver received
$100 of interest, they cannot have equal utilities when the saver receives
$150 of interest. Instead, the utility the saver will receive from consumption
of his additional $50 of interest must cause his utility to exceed that of
the nonsaver.
According to the present value theory, however, the increase in the
interest rate from 1001o to 1507o does not cause the saver's utility to
exceed the nonsaver's. Instead, the saver's utility is no greater than it
was when he was receiving only $100 of interest income. The present
value theory arrives at this peculiar result because it focuses on a mathematical concept-the present value of consumption-rather than on the
level of actual consumption. The increase in the interest rate not only
causes the saver's consumption to be $50 greater than before, but for
purposes of the present value calculation causes a heavier discount rate
to be applied to future consumption. This heavier discount rate exactly
offsets the saver's increased consumption, leaving the present value of
his consumption at the same $1,000 level as previously. Since the present
value of consumption is thought to measure utility, the saver is no better
off with $150 of interest than with $100 of interest. This bizarre result
demonstrates that the present value of consumption cannot measure utility,
and thus that the present value theory fails to show that double taxation
is unfair.
Although the present value theory is wrong, its underlying rationale
is attractive.38 In order to explain that rationale, we must assume that
the saver allocates his first year income between savings and first year
consumption, rather than just saving all of his income as has been assumed
thus far. From this assumption, it follows that the saver will allocate
his first year income between first year consumption and savings so as

37. See supra text accompanying note 30.
38. Some readers may both be convinced that the present value theory is wrong and be uninterested
in the intricacies of that theory. They should feel free to skip to the next section.
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to maximize his utility. 9 His utility will be maximized when the last
dollar of his first year income gives him the same utility whether it is
saved or consumed (the utility received from a dollar of savings includes
the utility that will be received from the corresponding interest income).
Otherwise, the saver could increase his utility by reallocating his income
between savings and first year consumption.
For example, if the last dollar of first year income resulted in more
utility when saved than when consumed, the saver could increase his
utility by shifting income from first year consumption to savings. The
utility he would gain from his additional savings would outweigh the
utility he would lose from his reduced first year consumption. Similarly,
if the last dollar of income resulted in more utility when consumed than
when saved, the saver could shift income from savings to first year
consumption, causing him to gain more utility from his additional first
year consumption than he would lose from his reduced savings.
Since the last dollar of first year income gives a saver the same utility
whether it is saved or consumed, it must be the case that any given
amount of consumption gives the same utility as the same amount of
savings (again, the utility received from savings includes the utility that
will be received from the corresponding interest income). Because consumption and savings give the same utility, savers and nonsavers with
equal first year incomes will have equal utilities if they receive equal
amounts of utility from any given amount of consumption.
This argument is ingenious but flawed. While it is true that the last
dollar of first year income will give a saver the same utility whether it
is saved or consumed, it does not follow that any given amount of
savings gives the same utility as the same amount of consumption. 4
Instead, the law of diminishing returns suggests that the utility received
from a given amount of savings could be either greater than or less than
the utility received from an equivalent amount of first year consumption.
According to the law of diminishing returns, the additional utility
received from additional savings or consumption will fall as savings or
consumption increases. Thus, a taxpayer receives less utility from the
last dollar saved or consumed than from other dollars saved or consumed.
If diminishing returns are not very pronounced, the utility received from
the last dollar saved or consumed may not be significantly less than the
utility received from other dollars saved or consumed. However, if diminishing returns are very pronounced, the utility received from the last
dollar saved or consumed may be much greater than the utility received
from other dollars saved or consumed.
Thus, if diminishing returns are less pronounced in the case of consumption than in the case of savings (and if first year income is divided

39. A basic premise of economic theory is that individuals will act in the manner which maximizes
their utilities. See, e.g., A. MAHANTY, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcs WITH APPLICATIONS 24 (1980).
40. Gunn, supra note 3, at 375-77; Klein, supra note 15, at 469-70.
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equally between consumption and savings), a given amount of first year
consumption would represent less utility than the same amount of savings.4 ' This would be the case even though the last dollar saved had the
same utility as the last dollar consumed. Similarly, if diminishing returns
are less pronounced in the case of savings than in the case of first year
consumption (and if first year income is divided equally between consumption and savings), a given amount of savings would represent less
utility than the same amount of first year consumption. Again, this would
be the case even though the last dollar saved had the same utility as
the last dollar consumed.
This analysis assumes that first year income is divided equally between
savings and consumption. If there is not such an equal division between
savings and consumption, the relationship between utility received from
consumption and utility received from savings is even harder to discern.
The reason for this is that, given a constant rate of diminishing returns,
the extent of diminishing returns will be greater the more that is saved
or consumed. For example, if just a few dollars are saved, the utility
received from the first dollar saved may not be much greater than that
from the last dollar saved. Thus, the relationship between the utility
received from any dollar of saving or consumption, and the last dollar
of saving or consumption, will depend both on the rate of diminishing
returns and the allocation of income between savings and consumption.
Still another problem with the present value theory is its assumption
that the utility received from any given amount of consumption will be
the same for savers as for nonsavers. The reason that some people save
more than others is that different people attach different relative utilities
to saving and consumption."2 There is no reason to believe that savers
will receive the same utility from consumption as nonsavers.
It may be concluded that the present value theory is wrong. The utility
of savers could easily exceed that of nonsavers even though the last dollar
of income represents the same utility whether it is saved or consumed.
B.

The Additional Utility Theory
We have seen that the present value theory attempts to show that the
double taxation of savings is unfair. The "additional utility theory"
attempts to show just the opposite-that the double taxation of savings
is fair. The additional utility theory is based on the idea that the act
of saving gives a saver utility in addition to that which he would receive
from immediate consumption. 3 Since only savers save," only they receive

41. This does not mean that people can increase their utility by reallocating income from
consumption to savings. Utility could be gained from such a reallocation only if the last dollar of
saving represented a greater utility than the last dollar of consumption, which it does not.
42. See infra text accompanying note 48.
43. Again, the utility that is received from saving includes the utility from the interest received
on those savings.
44. The remainder of the article will return to the original assumption that nonsavers save none
of their incomes, and savers save all of their incomes.
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this additional utility. It follows that the utility of a saver will exceed
that of a nonsaver, where the saver and the nonsaver have equal first
year incomes. Thus, a wage tax is horizontally inequitable because such
a tax will impose the same tax upon the saver as upon the nonsaver
even though the saver has a greater utility. If4 5horizontal equity is to be
achieved, a tax must be imposed on interest.
Before we investigate the soundness of the additional utility theory,
we should note that it ignores the indirect tax on interest imposed by
the wage tax. If that indirect tax is taken into account, the wage'tax
will impose a greater tax burden on the saver than on the nonsaver.
This is because both the saver and the nonsaver will face the wage tax,
but only the saver will face the additional tax on interest income. Thus,
contrary to the conclusion of the additional utility theory, the saver does
face a greater tax burden to go along with his greater utility. Because
the additional utility theory ignores the indirect tax on interest, it, like
the present value theory,46 is based upon the wrong notion of horizontal
equity.
The additional utility theory clearly is correct in its assertion that the
act of saving gives a saver utility in addition to that which he would
receive from immediate consumption. If it did not, he would not bother
to save. Thus, the utility of the saver must exceed that of the nonsaver
if the saver and nonsaver would have equal utilities in a world in which
there was no opportunity to save.
In a world in which there was no opportunity to save, however, the
utility of the. saver might be less than that of the nonsaver. If so, the
additional utility that the saver does receive by saving rather than consuming his income might be insufficient to cause his utility to exceed
that of the nonsaver. The validity of the additional utility theory depends,
therefore, on a comparison of the utilities of a saver and a nonsaver in
a world in which savers are unable to save.
The saver and the nonsaver would appear to have equal utilities in a
world in which savers are unable to save. Both would spend their incomes
as soon as they earned them, so both would have the same level of
present consumption. Intuitively, it seems that a saver and a nonsaver
with equal levels of present consumption should receive equal levels of
utility. 47 It doubtless is this intuitive feeling upon which the additional
utility theory is based. This is an instance, however, when intuition is
wrong.

45. See Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 655-57, 660; Warren, Fairness, supra note 4, at 10971101.
46. See supra text accompanying note 30.
47. One of the assumptions underlying the present value theory was that savers and nonsavers
who are free to allocate their incomes between present consumption and savings will receive equal
utilities from a given amount of present consumption. See supra text accompanying note 42. That
assumption differs from the view being considered here, which is that savers and nonsavers who
are forced to spend their entire incomes on present consumption will receive equal utilities from a
given amount of present consumption.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

Imagine a world in which no present consumption is possible. This is
a world in which both the saver and the nonsaver must save their entire
incomes and then consume their savings at a given time in the future.
Since the saver and the nonsaver have equal present incomes, they will
have equal savings and equal levels of future consumption. If equal levels
of present consumption imply equal levels of utility-as is assumed by
the additional utility theory-it should also be true that equal levels of
future consumption imply equal levels of utility. Thus, in our imaginary
world in which only future consumption is possible, the saver and the
nonsaver should have equal levels of future utility.
Now imagine that the ability to consume in the present is introduced
into our imaginary world. The saver will not shift his consumption to
the present, because he receives more utility from saving than from
present consumption. The nonsaver, however, will stop saving and consume his income immediately, because he receives more utility from present
consumption than from saving. Thus, the utility of the nonsaver will
increase, while that of the saver will be unchanged. Since the saver and
the nonsaver had equal utilities when all income had to be saved, it
follows that the nonsaver has a greater utility when immediate consumption is possible. Thus, the present utility of the nonsaver exceeds
that of the saver when people are free to either save or consume. This
conclusion, of course, is just the opposite of what the additional utility
theory strives to prove.
In summary, one can "prove" that the present utility of a saver exceeds
that of a nonsaver by assuming that the saver, and the nonsaver have
equal utilities in a world in which all consumption must occur in the
present. One also can "prove" that the present utility of a nonsaver
exceeds that of a saver by assuming that the saver and the nonsaver
have equal utilities in a world in which all consumption must occur in
the future. The additional utility theory concludes that the double taxation
of savings is fair because it bases its analysis on the first assumption
rather than on the second. Because reliance on the second assumption
leads to the opposite conclusion, the additional utility theory is unsound.
If one is to make assumptions, one probably should assume that the
people who will have the greatest utility in a given world are those who
prefer that world. Given a choice, the saver would prefer to save, while
the nonsaver would prefer to consume. 4 8 A world in which no current
consumption is possible is a world which fits the preferences of the saver
but not the preferences of the nonsaver. In such a world the utility of
the saver probably would exceed that of the nonsaver. Similarly, a world
in which no saving is possible is a world which fits the preferences of
the nonsaver but not the saver. In such a world the utility of the nonsaver
probably would exceed that of the saver.
Since the utility of a saver would fall short of that of a nonsaver in
a world in which no saving was possible, it cannot be known whether

48. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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the utility received from saving causes the saver's utility to exceed the
nonsaver's. It follows that the additional utility theory is wrong when
it claims that the utility of the saver will exceed that of the nonsaver.
Mark Kelman proposed a modification of the additional utility theory.4 9
According to Kelman, the utility that the saver receives by saving rather
than by consuming his income should be taxed if it is due to rent, but
it should not be taxed if due to consumer surplus. Rent and consumer
surplus refer to the two different ways in which a saver could receive
utility from the act of saving.5 0
The concept of consumer surplus is closely related to the law of
diminishing returns. According to the law of diminishing returns, the
utility that the saver receives from additional savings will fail as the level
of his savings increases. Thus, the saver will receive less utility from his
second dollar of saving than from his first, less utility from his third
dollar of saving than from his second, and so on. 5 He will gain no
additional utility from saving rather than consuming his last dollar of
saving if, as explained in the discussion of the present value theory, he
has allocated his income between first year consumption and savings in
the manner which maximizes his utility1 2 Consumer surplus is the name
given to the utility received from the act of saving when diminishing
returns cause the utility from each extra dollar of savings to smoothly
dwindle away to nothing.
Rent is the name given to a gain which does not dwindle away to
essentially nothing for the last few dollars saved. When the saver receives
significant utility even from the last dollar saved, he is receiving rent.
Rent occurs when people have some desired level of savings, and will
save that amount regardless of the interest rate. For example, the saver
might save $100 if the interest rate were anywhere between 50 and 1507o.
Only if the interest rate fell below 57o would he reduce his savings below
$100, and only if the interest rate rose above 1507o would he-increase
his savings above $100. Because he would be willing to save $100 if the
interest rate were only 507o, any interest rate above 507o but below 1507o
will give him significant utility even from the last few dollars saved.
That significant utility is rent. At an interest rate of 1207o, for example,
he would receive rent of 70o (the amount by which 12076 exceeds 507o)."
It must be emphasized that it is only for the last few dollars saved
that there is any significant difference between consumer surplus and
rent. Although in the case of consumer surplus the utility from additional
savings dwindles away to essentially nothing for the last few dollars saved,

49. Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 670-79.
50. See Hmsm.msa, supra note 36, at 212-13 and 477-78.
51. Although the additional increments to utility are falling in size, total utility still is increasing.
52. See supra text accompanying note 39. Of course, a saver will be able to allocate his income
between first year consumption and savings only if he does not save all of his income.
53. The law of diminishing returns could apply in the case of rent. However, although the
utility from additional savings would fall as savings increase, it would not fall smoothly to zero.
Instead, at some point any additional savings would cause it to immediately plunge to zero.
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a significant gain still is received from all other dollars saved. Thus, for
most of the dollars that he saves, the saver receives significant utility in
the case of consumer surplus as well as in the case of rent.
According to Kelman, the fairness of the double taxation of savings
depends on whether the gain that the saver receives from the act of
saving is due to consumer surplus or to rent.14 If it is due to consumer
surplus, the double taxation of savings is unfair. If it is due to rent,
the double taxation of savings is fair. Kelman does not explain why he
takes this position. This lack of explanation is unfortunate, because there
is no apparent reason for his position. The existence or absence of
significant utility from the last few dollars saved would seem to have
no relevance to the issue of whether or not interest from all other dollars
saved should be taxed. True, the utility of the saver will be somewhat
greater if the saver receives significant rather than insignificant additional
utility from the last few dollars saved. Accordingly, it might be argued
that a tax on interest should be somewhat greater in the case of rent
than in the case of consumer surplus. It does not appear, however, that
this has any relevance to the more basic question of whether there should
even be a tax on interest.
Even if Kelman is right in treating the utility from rent differently
from the utility from consumer surplus, his argument has the same flaw
as the more traditional additional utility argument. Namely, a demonstration that the saver receives more utility from the act of saving than
from immediate consumption does not imply that the utility of the saver
is greater than that of the nonsaver."1 As explained above, the nonsaver
probably would have a greater utility than the saver in a world in which
no one could save, because such a world fits the preferences of the
nonsaver but not the saver. Although the opportunity to save will give
the saver additional utility, there probably is no way to know whether
this additional utility will cause his utility to exceed that of the nonsaver.
The fact that the additional utility comes from rent rather than consumer
56
surplus will not change this result.
Even if Kelman's argument were theoretically correct, it probably would
be wrong on empirical grounds.57 This is not surprising. It is difficult
to think of a reason that a saver would wish to save a fixed amount
regardless of the interest rate.5" The only plausible reason that comes to

54. "The tax system has never paid attention to the sort of psychic benefit that consumer surplus
represents. Only if all, or nearly all, [savers] are earning [rent) does a real problem exist." Kelman,
Fairness, supra note 4, at 657 n.23.
55. Kelman, however, claims that it does. "Without question, if [Kelman's theoryl is correct,
the saver is better off than the consumer .... " Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 675.
56. The additional utility is likely to be somewhat greater if it comes from rent than if it comes
from consumer surplus, so the probability that the saver's utility will exceed the nonsaver's is
somewhat greater in the case of rent than in the case of consumer surplus.
57. See Boskin, Taxation, Savings, and the Rate of Interest, 86 J. PoL. EcoN. S3 (1978) (the
level of saving is not fixed, but rather varies with the interest rate).
58. Kelman cites to three economic theories in his attempt to show that changes in the interest
rate will not affect the level of savings. Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 673-75. These theories
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mind is that the saver might desire to save for one specific future purchase
with no desire to save for any other future purchases.5 9 But, even then,
the amount he saves would vary with the interest rate. Consider, for
example, a saver who desires to purchase $1,100 of merchandise next
year. If the interest rate were 10076, he would have to save $1,000 this
year in order to have enough to make the $1,100 purchase next year.
If the interest rate were 5070, he would have to save somewhat more$1048-because he would be receiving less interest than at the 1007 interest
rate. If the interest rate were 15076, he would have to save only $957,
because he would be receiving more interest than at the 1007 interest
rate. Thus, even when a saver plans to make one definite purchase,
changes in the interest rate would cause changes in his level of saving.
It follows that the saver is very unlikely to receive rent from his savings.
C. The Expectation Theory
The basic idea underlying the "expectation theory" was first proposed
by Alvin Warren,60 and later developed by Mark Kelman'.6 The expectation
theory is similar in many respects to the present value theory described
above.6 2 The expectation theory differs from the present value theory in
its conclusion regarding the utilities of a saver and a nonsaver with equal
first year incomes. Whereas the present value theory concludes that the
utility of the saver equals that of the nonsaver, the expectation theory
concludes that the utility of the saver exceeds that of the nonsaver.
Accordingly, while the present value theory finds that the double taxation
of savings is unfair, the expectation theory finds that it is fair.
Since the expectation theory is similar to the present value theory, the
present value theory should be briefly reviewed. The present value theory
involves four steps. First, the theory focuses on the manner in which
taxpayers allocate their incomes between savings and consumption. It
observes that a taxpayer will maximize his utility by allocating his income
so that he will receive the same utility from the last dollar he saves as
from the last dollar he consumes. Second, the theory reasons that-since
the saver receives the same utility from the last dollar he saves as from
the last dollar he consumes-he must receive the same utility from a
given amount of saving as from an equivalent amount of consumption.
Third, it assumes that the saver receives the same utility from consumption
as the nonsaver does. Fourth, it deduces from the second and third steps

are Friedman's permanent income hypothesis, Marglin's disequilibrium hypothesis, and Duesenberry's
relative income hypothesis. It is not at all clear that these theories have the implications Kelman
claims for them. For example, Professor Paul Wonnacott, an economist who is an expert on
macroeconomics, expressly states that under Friedman's theory the rate of interest will be a factor
influencing the level of saving. WONNACOrr, MACROECONOMICS 333-36 (1974).
59. An implausible reason is that savers do not have any present consumption. Although at
times this article has simplified the analysis by assuming that savers do not have any present
consumption, this assumption certainly does not describe behavior in the real world.
60. Warren, Fairness, supra note 4, at 1097-1101.
61. Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 653-70.
62. See section A of this part of the article.
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that the saver must receive the same utility from a given amount of

savings as the nonsaver receives from an equivalent amount of consumption. From this analysis, it concludes that the double taxation of
savings is fair. We have seen that the second and third steps of the
present value theory are wrong. 63 Thus, the present value theory does
not show that the utility of the saver equals that of the nonsaver.
The expectation theory assumes (for the sake of argument) the validity
of all the steps of the present value theory except for the first. 4 It
questions the soundness of the first step, because at the time that the
saver allocates his income he does not know the actual utility he will
receive from his savings. 65 He will know that only at the time that he
actually consumes his savings in the future. Thus, there is no reason to
believe that the saver will be able to maximize his utility by allocating
his income so that he receives the same utility from his last dollar of
consumption as from his last dollar of savings.
The expectation theory points out that the saver allocates his income
between consumption and savings on the basis of the utility that he
expects to receive from his savings. Thus, the present value theory is
based on the premise that the saver allocates his income so that his
expected utility (not his actual utility) from his last dollar of savings
equals his actual utility from his last dollar of consumption. The present
value theory accordingly shows that the expected utility the saver receives

63. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
64. Warren's argument may be more of a criticism of the present value theory than an advocacy
of the expectation theory. If so, he may not be willing to accept the other steps of the present
value theory.
65. The expectation theory as presented here differs somewhat from that presented by Warren
and Kelman. Warren's argument is unclear, but it appears that rather than looking at the present
value of present and future consumption, as the present value theory does, he would look at the
present value of past and present consumption. See Warren, Fairness, supra note 4, at 1100. The
present value he would place on past consumption is the present utility people would receive from
their memories of past consumption. Id. The utility received from memories of past consumption
almost certainly will be very slight, which means that nonsavers-who consumed everything in the
past, and have nothing to consume now-will have only a nominal present utility. Savers, however,
have some present consumption, and they get significant utility from it. Thus, the present utility
of savers will exceed that of nonsavers.
If this is Warren's argument, it cannot be reconciled with his position, infra note 68, that tax
liability should depend on outcomes. The relevant outcome would be the utility that people received
from their past consumption at the time of that consumption, not the utility that they later receive
from memories of that consumption. Utility received from memories of that past consumption would
slightly increase their total utility, but otherwise should have no effect on utility.
Kelman's version of the expectation theory also is unclear, but appears to make more sense than
Warren's. Under Kelman's version, the present value of past consumption apparently is the actual
utility that was received from past consumption minus any disutility received since then. Kelman,
Fairness, supra note 5, at 659-60. Disutility could be received since then because people might regret
that they spent their income in the past rather than in the present. Id. Kelman's version thus looks
at actual outcomes-actual utility received at the time of consumption minus actual disutility received
since the time of consumption. Since it is nonsavers who receive the most disutility from past
consumption, their utility will be less than that of nonsaver's. Kelman's version is not presented
in this article because any disutility received from regret about past consumption choices probably
would be very slight. Kelman also.presents another version of the expectation theory which is very
similar to that presented here. Id. at 655-56.
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from a given amount of savings equals the actual utility that the nonsaver
receives from an equivalent amount of consumption.
Needless to say, this distinction between actual and expected utility
from savings is irrelevant if actual utility equals expected utility. But if
actual utility exceeds expected utility, the actual utility that the saver
receives from a given amount of savings would exceed the actual utility
that the nonsaver receives from an equivalent amount of consumption.
Thus, the saver's actual utility would exceed the nonsaver's. If actual
rather than expected utility is the proper measure of horizontal equity,
horizontal equity will be achieved only if the saver bears a heavier tax
than the nonsaver. A tax on interest will impose such a heavier tax, and
thus the double taxation of savings is fair.
It must be noted, as it was noted above for the present value66 and
additional utility67 theories, that the expectation theory ignores the indirect
tax on interest imposed by the wage tax. If that indirect tax is taken
into account, the wage tax will impose a greater tax burden on the saver
than on the nonsaver, because both the saver and the nonsaver will face
the wage tax, but only the saver will face the additional tax on interest
income. Thus, contrary to the conclusion of the expectation theory, the
saver does face a greater tax burden to go along with his greater utility.
Because the expectation theory ignores the indirect tax on interest, it is
based upon the wrong notion of horizontal equity.
The expectation theory clearly is correct in its position that actual
utility, rather than expected utility, is the proper measure of utility. Tax
policy questions are seldom, if ever, thought to depend on the expectations
of taxpayers-in this case, the expected utility of the saver. Instead, they
depend on outcomes-in this case, the actual utility that the saver will
receive when he consumes his savings. As an example of this distinction
between expectations and outcomes, a person who expects to make a
fortune on an investment which actually results in a loss is not taxed
on his erroneous expectation of future wealth. Similarly, a person who
expects to receive a low return on an investment which is spectacularly
successful is taxed on his wealth despite his modest expectations. Following
the same reasoning, if the actual utility that the saver receives from his
savings differs from his expected utility, he should be taxed on his actual
rather than on his expected utility.
The expectation theory still must show, however, that the utility the
saver actually receives from his savings exceeds the utility he expected
to receive at the time that he saved. There are two possible ways to
show this. 69 The first is to show that the saver is shortsighted, and the
66. See supra text accompanying note 37.
67. See supra text accompanying note 46.
68. Warren, Fairness, supra note 4,'at 1098; Kelman, Fairness, supra note 4, at 654-56.
69. Kelman mentions a third way-people may erroneously believe they will not have as much
capacity to enjoy consumption in the future as in the present. Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at
669. Kelman appears to believe that this argument is weak, and it is not clear why he mentions
it. There can be little doubt that people often incorrectly estimate their capacity to enjoy consumption
in the future, but overestimation probably is just as likely as underestimation. There is no apparent
reason that people would err more on one side than on the other.
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second is to show that the saver takes the probability of his death into
account when deciding how much to save. 70 A saver may be shortsighted
in the sense that he underestimates the utility he will receive from his
consumption of his savings.7 ' This argument cannot be pushed too far,
because it is clear there are limits to shortsightedness. If the saver were
very shortsighted, his expected utility from savings would be so low that
he would not save at all. All that the expectation theory need show,
however, is that the saver is shortsighted to some extent. As long as the
saver underestimates the utility he will receive from future consumption,
his actual utility will exceed the nonsaver's.
There is an intuitive appeal to the idea that the saver will underestimate
his future utility. The saver doubtless gets more utility from present
consumption than from the knowledge that he will be able to consume
in the future, so he may underestimate his future utility when deciding
how much to save. One must be careful, however, not to confuse two
separate types of utility. The first is the future utility that the saver
expects to receive when he consumes his savings. This is expected utility.
The second is the current utility that he receives from his anticipation
of that future consumption. The saver could receive no current utility
from the anticipation of future consumption, yet correctly estimate the
future utility that he will receive from that future consumption. For
example, someone who has just finished a meal may receive no current
utility from the knowledge that he will have a similar meal the next day.
However, the odds are good that he will correctly estimate the utility
that he will receive from the next day's meal, and that he will budget
for that meal. Similarly, a family that has just returned from a vacation
trip might get no utility (or even negative utility) from the knowledge
that they will have a similar vacation trip the next year. However, their
past experience with vacation trips should enable them to correctly estimate
the utility they will receive from next year's trip and to set aside the
appropriate level of savings for that trip. 2 Thus, expected utility could
equal actual utility even if no current utility is received from the anticipation of future consumption.
If people actually are shortsighted, the expectation theory should be
more applicable to young savers than to older savers. In hindsight, savers
will realize that they consumed too much of their past incomes and saved
too little. People doubtless learn from their mistakes, so their shortsightedness should disappear with age. It follows that the expectation
theory is more likely to be valid when applied to younger savers than
when applied to older savers. Thus, the double taxation of savings should
be more easily justified in the case of young savers than in the case of
73
older savers.

70. See Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 658-60; Warren, Fairness, supra note 4. at 1100-01.
71. See Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 658-60, for reasons this may occur.
72. An estimate of future utility is unlikely to be completely accurate. All that is required,
however, is that estimates of future utility are accurate on average.
73. A well-designed survey could be used to test the idea that people are shortsighted. If people
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The second reason that the saver's actual utility might exceed his
expected utility is that the saver may take the probability of his own
death into account when deciding how much to save.7 4 The greater the
probability that a saver will die before consuming his savings, the less
will be his expected utility from those savings. 7 For example, a saver
might correctly estimate the utility he would receive from consumption
in his one-hundredth year if he were to live that long. Since he is unlikely
to live that long, however, he would not expect to receive much utility
from savings that were not consumed before his one-hundredth year. If
he did live to be one hundred, the actual utility he received from
consumption in his one-hundredth year would turn out to be much greater
than the utility he had expected to receive. Thus, his actual utility would
exceed his expected utility. According to the expectation theory, this
means that a tax should be imposed on his interest income.
This argument is flawed, because it considers only the utility of a
saver who survives to a certain age. The utility of savers who do not
survive must also be considered. Imagine a group of five savers, each
with a 20076 chance of surviving to a given age. In accordance with the
probabilities, only one member of the group actually survives to the given
age. As we have seen above, the actual utility of the saver who survives
to the given age will exceed his expected utility. The other four savers
die before they are able to consume their savings. Those unconsumed
savings give each of them an actual utility of zero, less than his expected
utility. Thus, each of the four savers who dies receives even less utility
than a nonsaver. In these circumstances, the expectation theory would
indicate that horizontal equity will be achieved only if the four savers
are taxed less heavily than nonsavers.
Thus, depending on whether or not a saver survived, his actual utility
could be either greater than or less than his expected utility. Unfortunately,
there is no way to know which it will be until he either survives to the
given age or dies. By that time the taxes already will have been imposed,
and it will be too late to adjust his tax burden. Thus, there is no way
to impose the appropriate tax burden on individual savers.
The next best thing is to design the tax system so that savers as a
group bear the appropriate tax burden. Consider the expected utility of
the five savers as a group. Since each saver has only a 2007o chance of
surviving to the given age, the expected utility of each is approximately
200 of the utility he would receive were he actually to survive to that
age. The expected utility of the group as a whole is five times the 2007o
expected utility of each of its members, or 10007o. Thus, the expected

are shortsighted, they will save too little. Thus, a survey should disclose that they feel they have
saved too little in the past.
74. For an extensive discussion of this possibility, see Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 66069. The discussion here is similar to Kelman's.
75. This assumes that people receive less utility from their bequests than from their consumption.
If that is not the case, this argument cannot be made. In order to keep the argument relatively
simple, it will be assumed that no utility is received from bequests.
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utility of the group as a whole equals the actual utility that the surviving
member of the group will receive. Since the actual utility of the group
consists entirely of the surviving member's actual utility, it follows that
the group's expected utility equals its actual utility. Thus, there is no
reason to tax savers more heavily than nonsavers.
In summary, we have considered two reasons that a saver's actual
utility may exceed his expected utility. First, his shortsightedness may
cause him to underestimate the utility he will receive from the consumption
of his savings. If so, the expectation theory demonstrates that a saver's
actual utility exceeds his expected utility. If certain premises of the present
theory are valid, the expectation theory also demonstrates that the saver
will have a greater utility than a nonsaver with the same first year income.
We have seen, however, that the premises of the present value theory
are invalid. Thus, the expectation theory, while interesting, does not
demonstrate that a saver will have a greater utility than a nonsaver.
The second reason that a saver's actual utility could exceed his expected
utility is that he might consider the probability of death when deciding
how much to save. We have seen, however, that the probability of death
will not cause actual utility to exceed expected utility, at least when savers
are viewed as a group.
One final aspect of the expectation theory must be considered-its
implications for the concept of economic efficiency. 76 Theories of the
fairness of double taxation seldom have any implications for economic
efficiency, because the economic efficiency of a tax system usually is the
same whether it is fair or unfair. 77 This would not be the case, however,
if the expectation theory's principal assertion were sound. That assertionthat a saver's actual utility from savings exceeds his expected utilityhas unusual implications for economic efficiency. If a saver's actual utility
exceeds his expected utility, he will not allocate his income between
present consumption and savings in the way which maximizes his utility.
Instead, he will allocate too much to present consumption and not enough
to savings because he will underestimate the utility he will receive from
his savings. His utility, and thus economic efficiency,7 would be increased
if there were some way to make him shift some of his income from
present consumption to savings. Typically, a government subsidy of the
interest rate would be used for that purpose. The economic efficiency

76. Economic efficiency can be improved if there is a way to reallocate resources so that the
gains of the winners exceed the losses of the losers. If the gains of the winners do exceed the losses
of the losers, the winners would be able to make a payment to the losers that fully compensated
them for their losses, yet the winners still would be better off than if the resources had not been
reallocated. Since such payments never are made, increases in economic efficiency may not be
desirable. See generally DuE & FRIEDLAENDER, GovERa er FiNANcE 9-20 (6th ed. 1977).
77. Thus, analyses of the fairness of various tax systems can usually safely ignore the efficiency
issue. Warren, for example, states that he will not consider economic efficiency. Warren, Fairness,
supra note 4, at 1082 n.7.
78. Increases in economic efficiency usually result in gains to some people and losses to others,
and thus may or may not be desirable. An increase in economic efficiency due to a reallocation
of income between savings and present consumption, however, has no apparent losers. Thus, this
is one instance where an increase in economic efficiency clearly is desirable.
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of such a subsidy is unique to the expectation theory. Under other theories
of the fairness of double taxation, economic efficiency would be maximized if there were no subsidy of the interest rate.7 9
The expectation theory thus leads to two opposing policy recommendations. When applied to the subject of fairness, it recommends that
interest income be taxed. When applied to the subject of economic
efficiency, it recommends that interest income be subsidized. We have
seen that the first policy recommendation is unsound because it is based
on the unsound present value theory. The second policy recommendation
is sound, however, if actual utility does exceed expected utility. The
second recommendation is not based on the present value theory, so it
is unaffected by any flaws in that theory. It may be concluded that the
expectation theory supports a subsidy, rather than a tax, on interest.
Thus, the expectation theory fails to justify the double taxation of savings.
D.

The Indirect Tax on Interest
As mentioned above,80 the present value theory, the additional utility
theory, and the expectation theory all are based on the assumption that
horizontal equity occurs when savers and nonsavers with equal utilities
bear equal direct taxes, even though the saver's tax burden (the sum of
indirect and direct taxes) may be much greater than the nonsaver's. Such
an approach to the issue of the fairness of double taxation is fundamentally
flawed.
The fairness of double taxation is an issue in tax policy because of
the possibility that there is something unfair about a "double tax" on
savers. This ostensible unfairness (and the concept of double taxation)
is due solely to the existence of the indirect as well as the direct component
of the tax on interest. An analysis of the fairness issue must therefore
either consider the effect of that indirect component upon fairness or
must explain why that component is not relevant to fairness.," The three
theories described above, however, just ignore that indirect component.
By so doing, they ignore the very component that creates the possibility
of unfairness. Thus, they could not conclude that double taxation is
unfair even though the possibility of such unfairness is the very issue
that they purport to explain.82

79. In a perfectly functioning economy, economic efficiency will be maximized if the government
does not intervene in economic matters. DuE & FLAEDa NDER, supra note 76, at 17. The expectation
theory is the only theory that implies that the economy will not function perfectly, so it is the
only one that implies that government intervention is desirable.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 37, 46, 66 and 67.
81. One approach might be to argue that a taxfree world is not the appropriate standard by
which to judge the fairness of a tax system. Gunn suggests such an approach, but he offers no
alternative to the taxfree world. Gunn, supra note 3. at 374.
82. It may appear that the theories are investigating the fairness of double taxation. However,
it is logically impossible for them to consider the fairness of double taxation when they ignore one
component of that tax. Since the theories assume that the direct component of the tax on interest
should not be imposed unless savers benefit from their interest income, and assume that the indirect
component is not a tax, they actually are considering whether there is enough utility from interest
income to justify even a single tax on interest.
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OTHER THEORIES THAT INVOLVE UTILITY

This part of the article will continue with the assumption that utility
is the appropriate measure of horizontal equity, but it will be based
upon the view that horizontal equity occurs when equally situated savers
and nonsavers bear equal tax burdens (the sum of the indirect and direct
components of taxes) rather than equal direct taxes only. Tax burdens
will be measured in terms of utility rather than in terms of money, with
a person's tax burden equalling the reduction in utility caused by the
tax under consideration. This differs from the above theories, which use
a hybrid of utility and money to measure horizontal equity. They use
utility when determining whether savers and nonsavers are equally situated,
but they use money when determining whether savers and nonsavers face
equal taxes. Here, utility will both measure tax burdens and determine
whether savers and nonsavers are equally situated. This has the advantage
of consistency.83 If utility is the appropriate measure of equally situated
taxpayers, it is the appropriate measure of a tax system's effect upon
equally situated taxpayers.
Section A will show that the double taxation of savings is unfair if
savers receive utility only from consumption. Section B will show that
double taxation can be fairer than a consumption tax (but not a wage
tax) if savers additionally receive utility from the holding of wealth.
Finally, section C will show that double taxation can be fair if the
disutility of work is thought to be relevant to fairness. It may be concluded
that the fairness of double taxation depends upon the source of utility
and upon the relevance of disutility.
A.

Utility is Received Solely From Consumption
This section of the article will assume that utility is received solely
from consumption, either present or future, with no utility received from
the holding of wealth. We will use the example of a saver with a wage
income of $1,000 in the first year and $100 of interest income in the
second year compared with a nonsaver with a wage income of $1,000
in the first year and a wage income of $100 in the second year. Assume
that the saver consumes all of his income by the end of the second year
and that the saver and the nonsaver have equal utilities." If we focus
only on utility flowing from the saver's and nonsaver's first year wage
incomes and any second year interest income, the saver will have a greater
utility than the nonsaver. Thus, a dollar of first year income gives more
utility to the saver than to the nonsaver. This is what the additional
utility and the expectation theories claim. Accordingly, this example will
enable us to determine the fairness of double taxation when a saver does

83. It also makes possible a more comprehensive analysis. For example, see infra sections B
and C for analyses that would not be possible if tax burdens were measured in money.
84. The example is one in which savers and nonsavers with equal incomes have equal utilities.
However, since we are focusing on utility, not money, we could just as easily use an example in
which savers and nonsavers have unequal incomes. The only requirement is that they have equal
utilities.
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in fact receive more utility than a nonsaver from a given wage income.
Because the saver and the nonsaver have equal utilities, they are equally
situated. Horizontal equity requires that such equally situated taxpayers
bear equal tax burdens, where tax burdens are measured in foregone
utility. A 20% wage tax will impose such equal tax burdens. It will cause
200o reductions in the first year wage incomes of the saver and the
nonsaver. It will also cause 20% reductions in the second year incomes.
of the saver and the nonsaver, with the nonsaver's $100 of second year
wage income directly taxed at the 20076 rate, and the saver's $100 of
second year interest income indirectly taxed at the 2007o rate. Since the
saver and the nonsaver have equal reductions in their monetary incomes,
they will have equal reductions in their consumption. Because they receive
utility solely from consumption, they also will have equal reductions in
their utilities. The wage tax therefore achieves horizontal equity,85 because
it imposes equal tax burdens (measured in foregone utility) upon equally
situated savers and nonsavers . 6 This is true even though the analysis is
based upon the assumption that a saver's interest income will cause his
utility to exceed that of a nonsaver with the same wage income.
Since a wage tax achieves horizontal equity, an income tax necessarily
is horizontally inequitable. The reason is that an income tax is merely
a wage tax with a supplemental tax on interest income. That supplemental
tax will cause savers, but not nonsavers, to be taxed more heavily by
an income tax than by a wage tax. Since equally situated savers and
nonsavers face equal tax burdens under a wage tax, it follows that they
will face unequal tax burdens under the income tax. Thus, the income
tax is horizontally inequitable.87 A consumption tax is horizontally equitable because, like a wage tax, it reduces the consumption of both the
saver and the nonsaver by the tax rate, and thus causes equally situated
taxpayers to forego equal amounts of utility. 88
It must be concluded that both a wage tax and a consumption tax
are horizontally equitable, while an income tax is horizontally inequitable.
This will be true even if a saver has a greater utility than a nonsaver
with the same wage income. Thus, when utility is received solely from
consumption, double taxation is horizontally inequitable.

85. This conclusion depends on a couple of assumptions. See infra text accompanying notes
120-21.
86. The expectation and additional utility theories would arrive at the same conclusion if they
focused on utility rather than on money. Because the saver receives the same utility from S1,000
of wage income as the nonsaver receives from S1,100 of wage income (where the utility from wage
income includes the interest received when that income is saved), each dollar of the saver's wage
income represents a 10% greater utility than each dollar of the nonsaver's wage income. A 20%
wage tax will cause the saver to pay a S200 tax on his $1,000 of first year wage income. Because
each dollar of the saver's wage income represents a 10% greater utility than each dollar of the
nonsaver's wage income, that tax represents the same amount of foregone utility as a S220 tax on
the nonsaver. Since the nonsaver does face a $220 tax, the equally situated saver and nonsaver
bear equal tax burdens.
87. As noted infra text accompanying notes 120-21, the income tax could be fairer than the
wage tax when tax rates vary over time or are progressive.
88. As noted infra text accompanying notes 120-21, a graduated rate will have no effect on the
horizontal equity of a consumption tax.
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Utility is Received From Wealth
We next must consider whether double taxation is unfair if savers

receive utility not only from consumption but also from wealth. Utility
could be received from wealth for several reasons. 9 First, wealth in large
quantities gives prestige and power. Second, wealth provides the ability
to consume at any time, so there are no lost consumption opportunities
during a wait for the next paycheck. Third, wealth gives a feeling of
financial security. Fourth, wealth provides people with the opportunity

to receive satisfaction from the management of their investments. Other
sources of utility from wealth doubtless also exist.
Consider again the example of a saver and a nonsaver who have equal
utilities in a taxfree world. Now, however, the saver receives utility not
only from consumption but also from his unconsumed wealth (his savings).
Accordingly, the saver now receives less utility from consumption than
does the nonsaver. Because a consumption tax only reaches utility from
consumption, it reduces the saver's utility by less than the nonsaver's. 9°
Accordingly, a consumption tax is horizontally inequitable. 9' It is important to note that this analysis applies only to unconsumed wealth.
Wealth which is held in the form of something that has been purchased
(such as a yacht) is taxed by the consumption tax and can be viewed
as just another consumption expenditure. The only wealth that escapes
the consumption tax is wealth which has not been purchased (unconsumed
wealth). It is only with respect to such wealth that the consumption tax

is unfair.
In order to be horizontally equitable, a tax must reduce utility from
unconsumed wealth by the same proportion that it reduces utility from
consumption. A wage tax will be horizontally equitable. We have previously seen that a wage tax reduces both wage income and interest
income by the tax rate. Since wage and interest income 92 are the two

89. See Guillebaud, Income Tar and the Double Taxation of Saving, 45 EcoN. J. 484, 489-90
(1935); Shachar, From Income to Consumption Tax: Criteria for Rules of Transition, 97 HARv.
L. REV. 1581, 1601 (1984).
90. Shachar claims that the consumption tax has a negative rather than zero tax rate on utility
from wealth. Shachar, supra note 89, at 1603. He arrives at this result by comparing the tax rate
on utility from wealth under the consumption tax with that on utility from wealth under the wage
tax. Shachar earlier had concluded that the wage tax imposes a zero tax rate on utility from the
holding of wealth. See infra note 94. Since a consumption tax imposes less of a tax on utility from
wealth than does the wage tax, it logically follows from his analysis that the consumption tax must
impose a negative tax rate on utility from the holding of wealth. The problem with his argument
is his view that the wage tax imposes a zero tax on the utility received from the holding of wealth.
The correct analysis is that the wage tax imposes a positive effective tax rate, while the consumption
tax imposes a zero effective tax rate. Warren does not commit this mistake. He correctly perceives
that the consumption tax is the appropriate tax if wealth is to be excluded from the tax base.
Warren, Fairness, supra note 4, at 1124.
91. The problem with the consumption tax is that it does not reach utility from wealth. This
problem could be prevented, and horizontal equity achieved, if an annual tax on wealth were added
to the consumption tax. The role of wealth in the tax system is discussed in Brennan & Nellor,
Wealth, Consumption and Tax Neutrality, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 427 (1982); Kiesling, Henry Simons,
Equality, and the Personal Income Tax, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 257 (1981).
92. Interest income is considered to include capital gains. See supra note 10.
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sources of wealth (whether unconsumed or not), 93 a wage tax reduces
unconsumed wealth by the tax rate. We also know that the wage tax
reduces consumption by the tax rate. If utility is affected in the same
manner by reductions in unconsumed wealth as by reductions in consumption, the wage tax will cause equal reductions in the utilities of the
saver and the nonsaver. 94
Since the wage tax is horizontally equitable, the income tax necessarily
is horizontally inequitable. An income tax is merely a wage tax combined
with a direct tax on interest, and that direct tax on interest causes the
effective tax rate on savers to be greater under the income tax than
under the wage tax. The effective tax rate on nonsavers, however, is no
greater than under the wage tax. This unequal treatment of savers and
nonsavers destroys the horizontal equity achieved by the wage tax.
It is interesting to compare the horizontal inequity of the income tax
with that of the consumption tax. Assume that a typical saver receives
a 10076 "rate of return" on his unconsumed wealth. That is, the utility
he annually receives from the various nonmonetary benefits of unconsumed wealth equals the utility he would receive if he were to annually
consume 1007o of his unconsumed wealth. The rate of return on wealth
is just the counterpart of the interest rate. One measures a benefit of
unconsumed wealth that is purely nonmonetary, and the other represents
a benefit of unconsumed wealth that is monetary (but which will be
nonmonetary when held as wealth or consumed). The sum of the two
represents the total benefit of unconsumed wealth (of saving). At a 1007o
rate of return on unconsumed wealth, a saver with $100 of unconsumed
wealth values the nonmonetary benefits of unconsumed wealth at $10.
Horizontal equity requires that those benefits be taxed. If they were taxed
at a 2007o tax rate, the saver would pay a $2 tax, leaving him with a
net benefit from unconsumed wealth of $8. Since the consumption tax
fails to tax those benefits, the consumption tax is horizontally inequitable
to the extent of the $2 that escapes tax.
At a 1007o interest rate, a saver with $100 of unconsumed wealth
(savings) will receive $10 of interest. A 20076 income tax rate will impose
a $2 tax. That $2 tax represents the horizontal inequity of the income
tax. Thus, where the rate of return on wealth equals the interest rate,
the horizontal inequity of the income tax equals that of the consumption

93. Inheritances and gifts are a source of wealth, but their source is interest or wage income.
94. Shachar erroneously states that wage and income taxes do "not reach the current benefits
of holding wealth. The initial accumulation is taxed, but the later, nonphysical return-the accumulation benefit-is received and consumed free of charge." Shachar, supra note 89, at 1601.
Although it is true that neither a wage tax nor an income tax will reach the utility received from
the portion of income that actually is saved, the income that actually is saved is only a portion

of the income that would have been saved in a taxfree world. Since both the income and wage
taxes reduce the amount saved, they reduce the utility received from the holding of wealth. Shachar's
analysis considers only the reduction in utility that the wage and income taxes would cause in a
world in which those taxes had already been imposed. Warren makes a similar mistake when he
claims that "only income taxation reaches wealth or the return to wealth." Warren, Fairness, supra
note 4, at 1122.
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tax. One imposes a tax burden that is too heavy by $2, and the other
imposes a tax burden that is too light by $2. 91
If the rate of return on wealth were to fall below the interest rate,
the inequity of the consumption tax would be reduced, while that of the
income tax would be unchanged. Thus, the consumption tax would be
less inequitable than the income tax. If the rate of return on wealth were
to increase above the interest rate, the inequity of the consumption tax
would be increased, making it more inequitable than the income tax.
However, the income tax's relative superiority would be due solely to
the consumption tax's greater unfairness, not to any fairness of the
income tax.
It may be concluded that the income tax will be fairer than the
consumption tax only if substantial utility is received from unconsumed
wealth. A comparison of the fairness of these two taxes therefore depends
on a knowledge of the actual rate of return on unconsumed wealth. As
we saw above,96 utility is received from the holding of wealth for several
reasons. First, wealth in large quantities results in prestige and power.
Second, wealth gives the ability to consume at any time, so there are
no lost consumption opportunities during a wait for the next paycheck.
Third, wealth provides a feeling of financial security. Fourth, the wealthy
may receive satisfaction from their ability to manage their investments.
Prestige is probably the benefit of wealth most likely to give significant
utility. The prestige that comes from unconsumed wealth (savings) must
be distinguished, however, from the prestige that comes from the consumption of wealth. The bulk of the prestige enjoyed by the wealthy
probably comes from their consumption of boats, airplanes, expensive
cars, opulent homes, and the like. Such prestige is not relevant here,
both because it will be reached by a consumption tax and because it is
enjoyed by wealthy nonsavers as well as by wealthy savers. The prestige
that is relevant here is prestige that is received before wealth is consumed.
Such prestige probably is relatively small, because wealth is likely to be
unknown until it is consumed, and unknown wealth carries no prestige.
Power and the ability to consume whenever desired are two more
sources of utility to the wealthy. 97 However, both of these sources of
utility are also available to the non-wealthy. Power is available to relatively
poor business executives and politicians,9" and the ability to consume

95. An income tax base is broader than a consumption tax base, and accordingly can raise the
same revenues with a lower tax rate. Consequently, an income tax will be somewhat fairer than
indicated here.
96. See supra text accompanying note 89.
97. Warren apparently refers to the ability to consume at any time when he says that from
"the perspective of the income tax, the consumption tax is deficient because it fails to take into
account the fact that productive nonconsumers receive claims for future consumption in the form
of property rights. Such producers have not only current consumption, but they also have an option
for additional consumption that can be exercised at will. Why, from the point of view of distributional
fairness, should the existence of such options be ignored?" Warren, Fairness, supra note 4, at 1094.
98. Business executives and politicians seem to quickly acquire wealth upon obtaining their
positions, however.
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whenever desired is available to anyone who can freely borrow. Thus,
an income tax will reach only a portion of the utility from these sources.9
It therefore is unclear whether the tax system is the appropriate means
to reach utility from power and the ability to consume whenever desired.'°
Perhaps it could be argued that the power that comes from wealth is
especially invidious and for that reason alone deserves tax. However,
that argument focuses not on the utility received from wealth, but instead
on the effects of power upon other people. That is unrelated to the
horizontal equity issue being considered here.' 0 '
The two final sources of utility from wealth are a feeling of financial
security and the ability to manage one's investments. There is not much
that can be said about these sources of utility, except to note that the
utility received from them probably is relatively small. The combined
utility received from all of these sources must be quite large if the rate
of return on unconsumed wealth is to be great enough to cause the
income tax to be fairer than the consumption tax. One may wonder if
these sources provide utility of this magnitude.
Even if savers do receive very substantial utility from unconsumed
wealth, it could be argued that a consumption tax necessarily is fairer
than an income tax. The argument would be that utility from nonmarket
sources such as prestige and power is irrelevant to the fairness of various
tax systems. Tax theorists typically argue for a comprehensive tax base,
but they rarely go so far as to argue that utility from nonmarket sources
should be considered when determining a taxpayer's tax liability. Many
tax theorists argue for the inclusion in the tax base of items such as
fringe benefits and imputed rent, but those items are merely market
goods that some people are able to acquire without entering the market.
For each person receiving a nontaxable fringe benefit there is someone
who has to purchase the same item on the market, and for each person
receiving imputed rent there is a renter who pays income tax on his
housing expenses. A tax on the utility received from the holding of wealth
differs from a tax on fringe benefits or imputed rent, because it is a
tax on utility that cannot be acquired on the market. Such a tax would

99. A portion of the burden of double taxation probably will fall on borrowers. See infra Part
V. Thus, an income tax will reach the utility that borrowers receive from their borrowing. It will
not, however, reach the utility that borrowers receive from their ability to consume whenever they
desire, because such utility is received regardless of whether borrowing actually occurs.
100. It has been argued that there should not be a tax on a type of utility unless the tax can
be imposed on all possible sources of the utility. See Klein, supra note 15, at 467-69. On this view,
an income tax should not be used to reach utility from power and the ability to consume, because
it would reach only one source of that utility. Warren, however, argues that one can validly tax
the benefits of wealth even though similar benefits are untaxed when received from sources other
than wealth. He draws a distinction between utility from persons (for example, the power of a
politician) and from things (utility from wealth), and he argues that it is appropriate to tax the
latter even when the former escapes tax. See Warren, Fairness, supra note 4, at 1123.
101. Also unrelated to the issue of horizontal equity is the argument that utility is highly correlated
with wealth, and thus it must be taxed if the wealthy are not to escape their fair share of taxes.
This argument is merely an argument for a more progressive tax system. If the wealthy are escaping
their fair share of taxes, tax rates should be made more progressive.
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be similar to a tax on the value of leisure, or a tax imposed on both
the donor and donee of a gift in order to reach the utility that both
receive. 0 2
The issue of the desirability of a tax on utility received from nonmarket
sources is beyond the scope of this article. 103 However, the position that
is taken on that issue should determine whether utility from unconsumed
wealth is relevant to the double taxation issue. If it is generally believed
that a tax system should not attempt to reach the utility received from
nonmarket consumption, it would seem to follow that the utility received
from unconsumed wealth is irrelevant to tax liability, and thus to the
double taxation issue. In contrast, if one takes the position that utility
from unconsumed wealth is relevant to tax liability, then it would seem
to follow that utility from other nonmarket sources also is relevant to
tax liability104
To summarize, savers probably receive utility from unconsumed wealth.
Such utility will be relevant to the fairness of double taxation if utility
from nonmarket sources is thought to be relevant to tax policy. If such
utility is thought to be relevant, a wage tax will be horizontally equitable,
and both income and consumption taxes will be horizontally inequitable. 05
A consumption tax will be less horizontally inequitable than an income
tax unless substantial utility is received from unconsumed wealth.
C.

Disutility From Work
The final issue that will be investigated in this part of the article is
the fairness of double taxation when disutility is received from work.
Consider a saver and a nonsaver, each who receive the same utility from
a given amount of consumption and incur the same disutility from a
given amount of work.106 However, due to the disutility of work, $2 of
wage income gives the same utility as $1 of interest income. Accordingly,
a nonsaver with $200 of wage income and a saver with $100 of interest
income are equally situated in a taxfree world. In other words, $100 of
the nonsaver's income merely compensates him for the disutility of work.
Only the remaining $100 gives him positive utility.

102. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 19, at 36-38, 41. Only the donee of a gift receives utility from
market consumption. The donor's utility comes from the satisfaction of giving the gift. If utility
from nonmarket consumption is to be untaxed, there should be a tax only upon the utility of the
donor. Such a tax could be achieved by imposing a tax only on the donor (reducing the size of
his gift), or only on the donee (reducing the portion of the gift he could spend on consumption).
In fact, however, even a tax on only the utility of the donee would be likely to reduce the utility
of the donor. The donor's utility doubtless depends on the utility the donee receives from the gift,
so the greater the tax on the donee's utility, the less the utility the donor receives from the gift.
103. Warren takes the view that the tax system could logically tax utility from some nonmarket
sources while letting utility from other nonmarket sources go untaxed. See supra note 100.
104. For the view that there should be a tax on both donors and donees, see H. SIMONs, PERSONAL
INcOME TAXATION 134.40 (1938).
105. For a similar conclusion, see Brennan & Nellor. Wealth, Consumption and Tax Neutrality,

35
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J. 427, 435 (1982).

106. It will be assumed that utility is received only from consumption, not also from the holding
of wealth.
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Horizontal equity requires that the equally situated saver and nonsaver
bear equal tax burdens, where tax burdens are measured in foregone
utility. However, neither a consumption tax nor a wage tax will achieve
horizontal equity. For example, a 2007o wage or consumption tax will
cause the saver's income to fall by $20 to $80, and the saver will receive
utility from his entire $80 of aftertax income. The same tax will cause
the nonsaver's income to fall by $40 to $160. The disutility of work is
the same as before, so $100 of the nonsaver's aftertax income still
compensates him for that disutility. Thus, he is receiving utility from
only $60 of his income. Because the saver and the nonsaver receive equal
utilities from a given amount of consumption, the wage or consumption
tax has caused the foregone utility (the tax burden) of the nonsaver to
be twice that of the saver. Accordingly, the wage and consumption taxes
are horizontally inequitable.107
The equally situated saver and nonsaver will bear equal tax burdens
only if the effective tax rate on interest income is twice the tax rate on
wage income. An income tax comes close to imposing such a tax rate.
At a 20% nominal tax rate, for example, an income tax imposes a 2007o
tax on the nonsaver and a 360o effective tax rate on the saver's interest
income. Such rates correspond to a $40 tax on the nonsaver's $200 of
income, and to a $36 tax on the saver's $100 of income. Consequently,
the double tax imposed by the income tax nearly achieves horizontal
equity, since the saver and the nonsaver face essentially equal reductions
in their consumption. The double taxation of savings thus is fair.
This analysis assumes, however, that utility from wage income is half
of the utility from interest income. Assume, instead, that utility from
wage income is three-fourths of that from interest income. 108 In that case,

107. It should be noted that savers have a form of disutility similar to the disutility of work.
Savers are able to earn interest income only because they are willing to postpone their consumption
until the future. However, present consumption generally gives more utility than the same amount
of future consumption. Thus, it is likely that a portion of the saver's interest income merely
compensates him for the utility he loses when he postpones his consumption. For this reason, a
saver may receive no more utility from a given amount of interest income than a nonsaver receives
from the same amount of wage income.
The saver's loss of utility (or disutility) is significantly different, however, from the disutility of
work. An example will illustrate this. Consider a saver and a nonsaver, each with a first year wage
income of S1,000. The saver has a second year interest income of S200, but half of that merely
compensates him for the disutility caused by the postponement of SI,000 of consumption until the
second year. The nonsaver has a second year wage income of $200, but half of that merely
compensates him for the disutility of work. A 20% wage or consumption tax will cause the second
year incomes of both the saver and the nonsaver to fall to $160. One hundred dollars of the saver's
aftertax income will compensate him for the disutity of work, so he will receive utility from only
S60 of his income. In contrast, the saver still receives disutity from the postponement of consumption,
but now only $800 of consumption is postponed. Thus, his disutility has decreased, and so has the
portion of his interest income that compensates him for his disutility. For example, if now only
S90 of interest income is needed to compensate him for his disutility, he will receive utility from
S70 of income. The nonsaver receives utility from only S60 of income, so the saver still has a
greater utility than the nonsaver. Consequently, the disutility from the postponement of consumption
does not affect the conclusion that the saver should face a higher effective tax rate than the
nonsaver.

108. In other words, disutility from work is somewhat less than in the above example.
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the nonsaver receives the same net utility from his $200 of wage income
as the saver receives from $150 of interest income. A 20% wage, consumption, or income tax still will reduce the nonsaver's consumption by
$40. Now, however, the wage or consumption tax will reduce the saver's
consumption by $30, which is $10 short of the $40 reduction in the
nonsaver's consumption. The income tax (at its 36% effective tax rate)
will reduce the saver's consumption by $54, which is $14 more than the
$40 reduction in the nonsaver's consumption. The income tax now is
even more horizontally inequitable than the wage or consumption tax.
It may be concluded that the fairness of double taxation will depend
upon the extent of the disutility received from working. The greater that
disutility, the greater the chance that double taxation is fair.
Of course, this conclusion is based on the assumption that the disutility
incurred from working is relevant to the fairness issue. It was argued
above that utility from wealth might not be relevant to the tax system
because such utility is from a nonmarket source. Disutility from work,
however, is inseparable from market consumption.' °9 Market consumption
can be viewed as a two step process, with the first step involving the
receipt of income and the second step involving its expenditure. Disutility
from the first step is the counterpart to utility from the second step.
The two steps taken together determine the utility from consumption,
so it could be argued that both steps have equal relevance to the fairness
issue." 0
To summarize, we have considered the fairness of double taxation
under three different assumptions. The first assumption was that utility
is received solely from consumption. Under this assumption, the wage
and consumption taxes are horizontally equitable, and the income tax is
horizontally inequitable. This is so even if savers receive a greater utility
from a given wage income than do nonsavers. The second assumption
was that utility is received both from consumption and from the holding
of wealth, and that both types of utility are relevant to tax liability.
Under this assumption, the wage tax will be horizontally equitable, while
both the income and consumption taxes will be horizontally inequitable.
The consumption tax will be less inequitable than the income tax unless
a substantial amount of utility is received from the holding of wealth.
The third assumption was that disutility is received from work, and that
this disutility is relevant to tax liability. Under this assumption, an income
tax can be more horizontally equitable than either a wage or consumption
tax. Thus, the double taxation of savings can be fair.

109. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04 for the argument that utility from the holding
of wealth may not be relevant to tax liability.
110. It can be argued that no distinction should be drawn between different sources of income.
See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HAv. L. Rav. 309, 375-80 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as Andrews, Deductions). If such an argument is valid, disutility would be irrelevant
since disutility necessarily depends on the source of income.
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THE ROLE OF UTILITY AND OTHER ISSUES

All of the theories of double taxation presented thus far have focused
on the utilities of savers and nonsavers. Underlying those theories was
the implicit assumption that utility is the correct measure of fairness.
This part of the article questions that assumption. Section A presents
the argument that utility is irrelevant to the fairness issue. Section B
shows that double taxation is unfair when money rather than utility is
used as the measure of horizontal equity. Section C discusses the idea
that tax liability should be based on ability to pay. Section D considers
the fairness of the wage and consumption taxes when tax rates are
graduated rather than flat.
A.

Is Utility Relevant to the Fairness Issue?
It is often taken for granted that utility is the correct measure of the
fairness of double taxation.' It can be plausibly argued, however, that
utility is irrelevant to the fairness issue. After all, utility is seldom thought
relevant to the fairness of taxes on noninterest income, so it is not clear
why it should be relevant to the fairness of a tax on interest income.
The view that utility has little relevance to the fairness of taxes on
noninterest income is illustrated by a debate between William Andrews
and Mark Kelman. Andrews and Kelman were concerned with whether
income that is spent on medical care should escape tax. Andrews argued
that such income should escape tax because a person who incurs medical
expenses is no better off than a person who incurs no medical expenses
but has a correspondingly lower income." 2 Kelman disagreed, and argued
that income spent on medical care should be taxed the same as any other
income." 3
A full exposition of the Andrews and Kelman positions is unnecessary
here. It need only be noted that Andrews and Kelman disagree over
whether utility is relevant to tax liability when income is spent in an
essentially involuntary manner. There is nothing in their articles to suggest
that either believes that utility is relevant to tax liability when taxpayers'
own preferences determine their consumption patterns. 1 4 Thus, in the
case of voluntary consumption, both would apparently let tax liability
be determined solely by the level of monetary income.
In the absence of a plausible argument that utility is relevant to the
fairness of a tax on interest income, none of the various theories described
above have much relevance to the fairness of double taxation. Instead,
only monetary income would be relevant to the fairness issue.

111. See, e.g., Warren, Fairness, supra note 4, at 1081, 1097-98; Kelman, Fairness, supra note
5.
112. Andrews, Deductions, supra note 110, at 335-37.
113. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax
and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831, 858-79 (1979).
114. For the argument that generalized judgments about the utility derived from market consumption are relevant to tax liability, see Kelman, Fairness, supra note 5, at 667-69.
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B.

The Appropriate Tax Treatment of Interest
When money rather than utility is used as the measure of horizontal
equity, horizontal equity will be achieved when taxpayers with equal

monetary incomes face equal monetary tax burdens."' Such equal monetary tax burdens will be achieved by either a wage tax or a consumption
tax, because either tax will cause the same proportionate reduction in
wage income as in interest income. A consumption tax does this by

directly taxing the amount of income available to be spent on consumption." 6 A wage tax does this by directly taxing wage income and

by indirectly taxing interest income. In contrast, an income tax does not
achieve equal monetary tax burdens, because it combines a tax on interest
with a wage tax, causing savers to be taxed more heavily than under
the wage tax. Accordingly, when money is the measure of horizontal
equity, the income tax is horizontally inequitable and double taxation is
unfair."'
C. Ability to Pay
The doctrine of ability to pay is normally used to justify progressive
taxation, or tax rates that increase with income." ' However, that doctrine
also could be applied to horizontal equity. If so, horizontal equity would
be achieved when taxpayers with equal abilities to pay face equal tax
burdens. However, taxpayers with equal abilities to pay are just those
who would have equal incomes in a taxfree world,"19 so the doctrine of
ability to pay does not cause any change in the definition of horizontal
equity. Thus, under the doctrine of ability to pay, horizontal equity will
be achieved by both the wage and the consumption taxes but not by an

income tax.'2 0

115. Equal monetary tax burdens will be achieved when equally situated taxpayers face equal
effective tax rates.
116. The consumption tax is imposed at a later time than the wage tax. This has potential
implications for fairness, because the consumption tax gives the saver access to funds which would
not be available under a wage tax. If utility is the measure of fairness, those funds will be relevant
to the extent that they increase the saver's utility. Such increased utility, however, would be due
to utility received from wealth, which already has been considered above. See supra text accompanying
notes 89-104. In contrast, if money is the measure of fairness, the additional funds held by the
saver would appear to be irrelevant, because any benefit that they represent would not affect fairness.
117. In other words, an income tax is not the appropriate tax if income is the appropriate tax
base. A consumption tax or wage tax will be the appropriate tax on income. This is not the
traditional view of tax theorists. See, e.g., Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 44, 46 (1967); Klein, supra note 15, at 476.
118. See R. GOODE, THE IND rVIuAL INcomE TAX 18 (1964); Gunn. supra note 7. at 378-88
(1979); W. BLUM & H. KALvEN, JR., THE UNE.ASY CASE FOR PRooREssIv E TAXATION 64-68 (1963).
119. The taxfree world must be used as the standard for determining which taxpayers are equally
situated; otherwise, ability to pay would be determined by reference to a world in which a tax
already was imposed. For a general discussion of this issue, see supra text accompanying notes 15.
18.
120. "By avoiding double taxation, [a consumption tax) squares with ability to pay." Fisher,
Double Taxation of Savings, 29 Am. Eco,. REv. 16 (1939).
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D. Progressive Tax Rates
The discussion in both this and the other parts of the article has
assumed that the tax rate will vary neither over time nor with the level
of income.' 2' When this assumption is relaxed, the fairness of the wage
tax will decrease. As we have seen, a wage tax imposes an indirect tax
on wage income because it reduces the income that is saved in one year
and thus the interest that is received in another year. The wage tax's
effective tax rate on interest income therefore is determined in the year
in which the wage income is saved, rather than in the year in which the
interest was received. This presents two possible sources of unfairness.
First, tax rates may have changed by the year the interest is received.
Second, even if tax rates are constant over time, the saver may have
moved into a different tax bracket due to progressive tax rates. In either
case, the effective tax rate on the saver's interest income will differ from
the correct tax rate. Accordingly, the wage tax would lack horizontal
equity.
In general, a wage tax's effective tax rate on interest income will be
unfairly low because people tend to be pushed into higher marginal tax
brackets as their incomes increase over time. A wage tax's effective tax
rate could be so low that the wage tax would be even more unfair than
an income tax. 122 A wage tax will, however, be fairer than an income
tax when tax rates vary randomly over time. In that case, the wage tax
will be just as likely to tax savers too heavily (because the tax rate would
have been higher in previous years) as to tax them too lightly. On average,
the wage tax would impose just about the right effective tax rate on
savers. In contrast, in some years the income tax might be fairer than
the wage tax, but on average it would impose an unfairly high effective
tax rate on savers.
The fairness of a consumption tax will not be affected by tax rates
which change over time or which are progressive. Since a consumption
tax is imposed only at the time of consumption, it always will impose
the same effective tax rate upon interest income as upon wage income.
V.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST BORROWERS

Thus far, the article has assumed that the burden of double taxation
falls entirely on savers. This assumption is unrealistic, because a direct
tax on interest will cause the interest rate to be higher than it would be
in a taxfree world. It is that higher interest rate, not the interest rate

121. See supra note 87.
122. As an example, a saver might face a 10% tax rate at the time he received the income he
saved and a 25% tax rate at the time he received the corresponding interest income. Under such
rates, a wage tax would impose a 10% tax on the interest income. Under the same rates, an income
tax would impose a 32-1/2% effective tax rate on the saver's interest income. Neither tax would
impose the correct 25% tax rate, but the income tax would be closer to the ideal than the wage
tax. Thus, the income tax would be less unfair than the wage tax. It is only because of the drastic
increase in the tax rate over time, however, that the income tax is fairer. A smaller increase would
reduce the unfairness of the wage tax, and could make it less unfair than the income tax.
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in a taxfree world, on which the tax on interest is imposed. Consequently,
savers will face a higher aftertax interest rate, and a lower effective tax
rate, than the article has suggested to this point. Accordingly, the income
tax will be less unfair to savers than suggested to this point. However,
any benefit to savers would be offset by a detriment to borrowers,
because borrowers will face a higher interest rate than in a taxfree world.
The burden of double taxation thus will be shared by borrowers and
savers.
The reason that a direct tax on interest drives up the interest rate is
that such a tax reduces the attractiveness of saving and thus the amount
that people are willing to save. The less that people save, the less money
that is available to be borrowed. The demand for borrowed funds is like
the demand for anything else-the less that is available, the greater the
price. In the case of borrowed funds, the price is the interest 2rate.
Thus,
3
the reduced supply of savings will drive up the interest rate.
A numerical example will illustrate how the higher interest rate will
shift the burden of double taxation from savers to borrowers. Imagine
that a 50% direct tax on interest would cause the pretax interest rate
facing borrowers and savers to rise from 10% to 147o.124 The 50016 tax
rate would cause the aftertax interest rate of the savers to be half of
14%, or 7076. Since the aftertax interest rate would be 5%o if the pretax
interest rate still were 10%, the double taxation of savings is not as
unfair to savers as it might otherwise appear to be. 25
However, a portion of the burden of double taxation has been shifted
to borrowers because borrowers now face a 14% rather than a 1007o
interest rate.' 26 Although borrowers do not directly pay a tax, they bear
a portion of the burden of the double tax, in this case an additional
interest-cost of 41o. '1 The total burden of double. taxation is even greater
than if only savers bore the burden, because the 47o cost to borrowers
is greater than the 207 benefit to savers (the increase in their aftertax
interest rate from 5% to 77o).
The shift of the burden of the double tax from savers to borrowers
will not improve the overall fairness of double taxation. While double
taxation might not be unfair to savers, there is little doubt that it is
unfair to borrowers. We have seen that there are two circumstances under
which double taxation could be fair to savers. First, it could be fair if

123. Borrowers would not face a higher interest rate under either a consumption tax or a wage
tax, because neither of those taxes reduces the aftertax interest rate facing savers. Thus, neither of
those taxes will cause a reduction in the level of savings, and neither will drive up the interest rate
facing borrowers.
124. The assumption that borrowers and savers face the same interest rate ignores the cost of
financial intermediaries such as banks. However, a more realistic assumption would not change the
analysis.
125. See Warren, Reply, supra note 15, at 937.
126. See Andrews, Reply, supra note 19, at 94849 n.3.
127. It is conceivable that the tax on interest could cause the interest rate facing borrowers to
rise all the way to 2007a, with the aftertax interest rate facing savers remaining at 10%. If so, the
tax on interest would have been shifted entirely to borrowers. In addition, borrowers may be able
to deduct their interest payments. If so, their burden will be reduced somewhat.
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disutility from the earning of income is thought to be relevant to fairness.
Disutility from the earning of income will have no application in the

case of borrowers, however, since the act of borrowing does not involve
the earning of any income. Second, double taxation might be less unfair

than a consumption tax if utility is received from wealth. Borrowers as
well as savers could receive utility from wealth if the money received

from borrowing is viewed as wealth, and if such "wealth" is not consumed
(and thus is not taxed by the consumption tax). '2 Assuming that borrowers
receive substantial utility from this "wealth," it could be fairer to tax
this utility with an income tax than to let it escape tax altogether under
a consumption tax. It seems very unlikely, however, that people receive
the same utility from borrowed money as from actual wealth.
It may be concluded that an income tax will be a fair tax only if its
fairness to savers (if any) outweighs its clear unfairness to borrowers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has considered a number of approaches to the fairness
issue. The first approach unsuccessfully attempted to compare the utilities
of savers and nonsavers. The implicit assumption underlying this approach
-is that double taxation is fair if the utility of the saver exceeds that of
the nonsaver, but is unfair if the utility of the saver equals that of the
nonsaver.
In Part III we saw that this assumption is wrong. Instead, the fairness
of double taxation is determined by the source of utility and by the
relevance of disutility. If consumption is the only source of utility, double
taxation will be unfair even if savers receive more utility than nonsavers
from a given wage income. If wealth also is a source of utility, double
taxation again will be unfair, but might not be as unfair as a consumption
tax. Finally, if the disutility received from working is thought relevant
to fairness, double taxation might be fair.
The analysis in Parts II and III is based on the implicit assumption
that utility is relevant to the double taxation issue. It can be argued,
however, that utility is irrelevant to the double taxation issue. If so,
double taxation will be unfair.
Finally, a direct tax on interest will drive up the interest rate, shifting
some of the burden of double taxation from savers to borrowers. This
is unfair to borrowers. Thus, the overall fairness or unfairness of double
taxation depends on whether its possible fairness to savers outweighs its
clear unfairness to borrowers.

128. It would cease to be "wealth" if it were consumed.

